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of the purposes or occupations mentioned in this paragraph. "'s
Note that the word "knowingly", used in the act of 1907, does not
appear in the latter statute, which also eliminates the provisions
relating to cases of doubt as provided for in the former. Might not
the court, in view of the change in the statute of 1919, have very
well said that the legislature intended, by omitting these provisions
from the statute, to make a change in its meaning, denying to the
person who violates the statute the defense, in a suit of the kind
under consideration, of showing that he was not negligent in violating it? Nevertheless the court has not done so. It apparently understood the statute merely as raising the prohibited age from fourteen to sixteen years. In Waldron v. Garland-PocaltontasCoal Co.,'4
which is the latest West Virginia case dealing with this statute, the
court indicates, at least, that it considers the doctrine of the Norman
Case unchanged by the statute. 15 It is submitted that in an action
of this kind the court should denominate violation-of the statute in
question at least negligence per se.
-W. F. K.
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EviDENcE.-The West Virginia Supreme Court in two recent cases,
held that an instruction which tells the jury that "they are the sole
judges of the evidence and of the weight to be given thereto, and
that they may believe, or refuse to believe, any witness or any part
of his evidence, and that when passing upon the credibility of any
witness they may take into consideration his interest in the
matter in controversy, the reasonableness or unreasonableness
of his statements, his bias or prejudice in the matter, if
any appear, and his demeanor upon the witness stand", is
erroneous, prejudicial and reversible error. The court cites to support its decision the case of State v. McCausland,' wherein the court
had held that this same instruction was erroneous on the ground
that it would permit the jury to reject the testimony of a witness
arbitrarily. It would seem that the reasoning of the court is hardly
applicable to the particular instruction in question, for the reason
't

ACTS 1919, Ch. 17, § 2.

14 109 S. E. 729 (W. Va. 1921).

Id. At p. 731 it is said: "The fact that the child is under sixteen years of age
makes the employment unlawful; and, if injury results, there is prima facie negligence on the part of the employer. See Norman v. Coal Co .......
1 State v. Long, 108 S. E. 279 (W. Va. 1921) ; State v. Weisengoff, 109 S. E. 706
(W. Va. 1921).
2 82 W. Va. 525, 96 S. B. 938 (1918).
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that the instruction does not tell the jury that they can arbitrarily
disregard the testimony of any witness. Instead, it goes ahead and
tells the jury what elements they may take into consideration when
passing upon the credibility of a witness.
Even if we adopt the view of the court that this instruction
might be misleading, it is difficult to justify the court's actual decision that the giving of such instruction was reversible error. It
would seem that the West Virginia court failed to follow the modern tendency not to reverse in a criminal case unless the court believes the error to have resulted in a substantial miscarriage of
justice.3 In each of these cases the juries were composed of reasonable men whose sworn duty it was to determine the guilt of the defendant. They were unquestionably the sole judges of the evidence
and the weight to be given thereto. Is it to be presumed that the
jury acted as unreasonable men and arbitrarily and without reason
disregarded the testimony of any witness? Several jurisdictions
have the rule that if there has been error that might have prejudiced the defendant there must be a reversal.' However, the better
and more modern rule seems to be that the defendant must show
that there has been error and that such error has been. prejudicial
to him.5 Although this rule has probably not yet received the
sanction of the majority of the courts in this country, it is the rule
that has prevailed in the English appellate courts for many years,
and is the rule that is now favored by our most advanced thinkers
in criminal procedure.6
In 1910 the American Bar Association
passed a recommendation that there should be no reversal by the
appellate court unless the court actually believed the error to have
resulted in the miscarriage of justice.7 The committee in charge
of this matter reported that such a rule already prevailed in the
courts of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Kansas, Wisconsin and
several other states.8 In 1919 Congress embodied this recommendation into our Judiciary Act, and it is therefore the rule that now
3 See Nathan A. Smyth, "The Limitation of the Right of Appeal in Criminal Cases,'17 HARv. L. Rav. 317. For a complete discussion of this subject see 35 REPORTS OP
AIMRIcA. BAR AssocrATION, 624 et seq.
& Boyd v. State, 16 Lea. (Tenn.)

149

(1885) ; Boren v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 637,

25 S. W. 775 (1894).
5 Coleman v. State, 6 Okla. Cr. 252, 118 Pac. 594. (1911). For a discussion of this
case see 25 HAv. L. REv. 387, and the cases there cited.Regina v. James Courtney,
7 Cox Cr. Cas. 111. See 15 YAI. L. J. 1.
I See Nathan A. Smyth, "The Limitation of the Right of appeal in Criminal Cases,"

17 HARV. L. REv. 317; J. H. Wigmore, "Criminal Procedure-'Good' Reversals atid
'Bad' Reversals." 4 ILL. L. REv. 352.
7 See 35 REPoaTS Or AasRIcAx BAR AssOcIATION, 624 et seq. The precise language
of the recommendation of the American Bar Associatton is taken from Order 39, Rule
6, of the Rules of the English Supreme Court of Judicature.
s See, 35 RPORTs Or AlxRPiCAN BAR AsSocrAmox, 624, 629, and cases there cited.
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prevails in our federal courts.9 California has adopted the same
rule by constitutional amendment.' 0
In neither of these two West Virginia cases" does it appear that
the instruction given resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Nor
is there anything in either case to indicate that the finding of the
jury would have been different if this instruction had not been
given. One of the leading writers on this subject has said: "As
for errors in judges' charges it is doubtful if in cases where the
testimony is prima facie sufficient to prove the crime, a verdict is
ever unjustly influenced by such error. Juries do not convict unless they are convinced of moral guilt."' 2 Today it is almost impossible for the trial court to try a case without committing some
error," and for that reason our most advanced thinkers have come
to the conclusion that it is best for our appellate courts to disregard technical errors and to reverse only where it will be in the
furtherance of substantial justice. In an extrajudicial article written some twelve years ago our present Chief Justice Taft recommended that "No judgment of the court below should be reversed
except for an error which the court, after reading the entire evidence, can affirmatively say would have led to a different verdict. '14
The West Virginia court had for many years held that the instruction in question correctly laid down the law." The trial courts
,of the state, relying on these earlier cases, have often given this
instruction. If the West Virginia court continues to follow its
present doctrine it must necessarily result in a reversal of many
convictions where this instruction has been given. Would it not
be better to follow the theory of Judge Pound of the New York

9 "On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or motion for a new
trial, In any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects
or exceptions which do not affect the substantial right of the parties." See 36 STAT.
AT' L. 1163; BARNES' FEDERAL CODE, 1921 Supplement, ch. 11, § 1043.
10 See CAL. STAT. OF 1911, 1798, c. 36.
11 State v. Long, supra; State v. Welsengoff, supra.
12 See Nathan A. Smyth, "The Delimitation of the Right of Appeal in Criminal
Cases." 17 HARV. L. REV. 317.
Is Lewis v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N. Y. 52, 67, 56 N. E. 548 (1900).
The court
in that case says : "After carefully and studiously examining the great number of
perplexing and difficult questions determined during the heat and excitement of a
sharp and protracted trial we can but admire and commend the scrupulous and intelligent care and ability evinced by the trial judge, and the almost unerring correctness of his ruling. When the number and variety of the questions raised are con-

sidered, we are surprised, not that a single error was committed, but that there
were not many more."
14 See 15 YALE L. J. 1.
Is State v. Dickie, 48 W. Va. 325, 37 S. E. 695 (1900) ; State v. Blickel, 53 W. Va.
.597, 45 S. E. 519 (1903).
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Court of Appeals, to review each case largely on its merits, rather
than rigidly to fetter the court with prior decisions without regard
to actual justice 716
-M. T. V.
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was an action to recover for an'interstate
shipment of goods consigned under a uniform bill of lading, requiring forty-eight hours, after notice to the owner of arrival, before liability as insurer ceased and that of warehouseman began.
Notice had been given, but the time period for removal had not
expired when the goods were destroyed. Held, the carrier was
liable as insurer for the value of the property. Del Signore v.
Payne, Director General of Railroads. 109 S. H. 232 (W. Va.
1921.)
There are three distinct views as to the liability of a carrier for
loss occurring after arrival and before delivery of a consignment.
The Massachusetts court applies the doctrine that insurance liability, ipso facto, terminates when the shipment arrives at its destination and is placed in the warehouse. Norway Plains v. Boston &
Maine R. Co., 1 Gray 263, 61 Am. Dec. 423. New Hampshire enforces the rule that a reasonable time for removal should elapse
before the carrier is discharged from its extraordinary liability.
Moses v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 32 N. H. 523,64 Am. Dec. 381. The
third rule, enunciated by the New York Supreme Court, holds that
the insurance liability of the carrier continues until the consignee has
been notified of the arrival of the goods, and has had a reasonable
time to take them away after such notification. McDonald v.
Western R. Co., 34 N. Y. 497. The various state courts seem to be
.n irreconcilable conflict as to the application of these rules. Each
doctrine has its advocates, who claim that a certain one represents
the sounder view. A North Carolina case says, "Not only does the
great weight of authority in this country sustain the view of Judge
Cooley (N. Y. rule), but such is the English and Canadian law."
Poythress v. Durham & Southern R. Co., 148 N. C. 391, 62 S. E.
515,18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 427 and note. England applies the rule
requiring notice. Mitchell v. Lancashire etc. R. Co., L. R. 10 Q. B.
256, Chapman v. Great Western R. Co., L. R. 5 Q. B. Div. 278.
WAREHOUSEmN.-This

18 Cuthbert W. Pound, "Some Recent Phases In the Evolution of Case Law",-31
YALE L. J. 361.
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